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NOTE
KANSAS V. GLOVER: GRANTING LAW ENFORCEMENT
FURTHER DISCRETION TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATORY
STOPS
NICOLE FULLEM *
In Kansas v. Glover, the Supreme Court of the United States analyzed
the reasonable suspicion doctrine and considered “whether a police officer
violates the Fourth Amendment by initiating an investigative traffic stop after
running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that the registered owner of that
vehicle has a revoked driver’s license.” 2 The Court’s decision turned on
whether it was common sense to assume that the driver of a vehicle is also
its registered owner. 3 The Court held that, for purposes of an investigatory
stop, there is a presumption that the registered owner of a vehicle is driving
the vehicle. 4
In what could have been an opportunity to clarify the reasonable
suspicion doctrine, the Court instead further blurred the line of reasonable
suspicion by departing from precedent and failing to balance the
governmental intrusion of a traffic stop against an individual’s Fourth
Amendment privacy interest. 5 Although the Court correctly acknowledged
that officers may rely on commonsense inferences, the Court wrongfully
ignored law enforcement’s primary responsibility––investigating potential
criminal activity and traffic violations––and inevitably discouraged law
enforcement officers from doing so. 6 Most importantly, the Court failed to
1
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1. 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020).
2. Id. at 1186.
3. Id. at 1189.
4. Id. at 1186.
5. See infra Section IV.A.
6. See infra Section IV.B.
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recognize the negative implications its ruling has on disadvantaged
communities. 7 Ultimately, Glover further erodes the Fourth Amendment. 8
I. THE CASE
On April 28, 2016, Deputy Mark Mehrer was patrolling in Douglas
County, Kansas when he observed a 1995 Chevrolet truck. 9 Although
Mehrer did not observe any traffic infractions, he decided to run the Kansas
license plate. 10 After running the plate through the Kansas Department of
Revenue’s file service, he learned that the truck was registered to an
individual with a revoked driver’s license, Charles Glover, Jr. 11 Mehrer did
not attempt to identify the driver of the truck but, instead, he assumed that
the registered owner of the truck was also the driver. 12 Subsequently, he
initiated a traffic stop based solely on the information that he learned through
the file service—the registered owner’s driver’s license had been revoked. 13
The traffic stop confirmed that Glover was driving the vehicle with a revoked
license, and Glover was charged with driving as a habitual violator. 14 Glover
filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the stop, reasoning that
Mehrer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. 15
The Kansas trial court granted Glover’s motion to suppress all evidence
seized during the stop. 16 The State appealed, and the Kansas Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that Mehrer properly initiated the stop because
7. See infra Section IV.C.
8. See infra Section IV.A–IV.C.
9. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1187.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1186–87; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-285(a)(3) (2021) (“The term ‘habitual violator’
means any resident or nonresident person who, within the immediately preceding five years, has
been convicted in this or any other state: (a) Three or more times of: . . . (3) driving while the
privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state has been canceled,
suspended or revoked, as prohibited by [Section] 8-262, and amendments thereto, or while such
person’s privilege to obtain a driver’s license is suspended or revoked pursuant to [Section] 8-252a,
and amendments thereto, or, as prohibited by any ordinance of any city in this state, any resolution
of any county in this state or any law of another state which is in substantial conformity with those
statutes . . . .”).
15. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1187.
16. Id. The trial court found that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe the driver
of the vehicle was the vehicle’s owner whose license was revoked. State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64,
67 (Kan. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020). The trial court judge
relied on human experience and found that it “was not ‘reasonable for an officer to infer that the
registered owner of a vehicle is also the driver of the vehicle absent any information to the
contrary.’” Id.
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“there were specific and articulable facts from which the officer’s
commonsense inference gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver
was committing a violation.” 17 Glover appealed, and the Kansas Supreme
Court reversed the Kansas Court of Appeals’ ruling, explaining that Mehrer
did not have reasonable suspicion because his assumption that Glover was
driving the vehicle amounted to “only a hunch” that Glover was engaging in
criminal activity. 18 The court reasoned that Mehrer had some reason to think
Glover was driving the vehicle, but he needed reasonable suspicion that
Glover was, in fact, the individual driving the vehicle. 19 The court rejected
the State’s “owner-is-the-driver presumption . . . because it relieves the State
of its burden by eliminating the officer’s need to develop specific and
articulable facts to satisfy the State’s burden on the determinative issue of
whether the registered owner is driving the vehicle, not whether the vehicle
is being driven.” 20 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
to determine “whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by
initiating an investigative traffic stop after running a vehicle’s license plate
and learning the registered owner has a revoked driver’s license.” 21
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Terry v. Ohio 22 was the first case to establish the reasonable suspicion
doctrine. 23 In this decision, the Court recognized that some brief police
intrusions were not subject to the warrant requirement and the probable cause
standard normally required by the Fourth Amendment. 24 The Court
emphasized reasonable suspicion varies depending on the facts and
17. State v. Glover, 400 P.3d 182, 188 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d, 422 P.3d 64 (Kan. 2018),
rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020). Specifically, the Kansas Court of Appeals
held that “a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of a vehicle to
investigate whether the driver has a valid driver’s license if, when viewed in conjunction with all of
the other information available to the officer at the time of the stop, the officer knows the registered
owner of the vehicle has a suspended license and the officer is unaware of any other evidence or
circumstances from which an inference could be drawn that the registered owner is not the driver
of the vehicle.” Id.
18. Glover, 422 P.3d at 66. The trial court reasoned that the State “must affirmatively produce
evidence showing the officer rationally inferred criminal activity based on specific and articulable
facts.” Id. at 72.
19. Id. at 68.
20. Id. at 70.
21. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2020).
22. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
23. See id. at 30–31 (holding the search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if an
“officer observes unusual conduct which leads [them] reasonably to conclude in light of [their]
experience that criminal activity may be afoot”).
24. See id. at 20 (“But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically
has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.”).
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circumstances surrounding each individual case. 25 After Terry, lower courts
developed a broad definition of what the reasonable suspicion standard
requires. 26 Section II.A discusses the Fourth Amendment and the reasonable
suspicion exception to the warrant requirement. 27 Section II.B analyzes the
development of the reasonable suspicion standard in the courts. 28 Finally,
Section II.C looks at the continuing conflict between the Fourth
Amendment’s individual privacy interest and an officer’s public safety
interest. 29
A. The Reasonable Suspicion Exception
The Fourth Amendment, in part, protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 30 It requires law enforcement officers to either have a
search warrant or, in the absence of a warrant, conduct the search “within a
specific exception to the warrant requirement.” 31 However, as the Court
acknowledged in Terry, a brief warrantless search or seizure supported only
by a police officer’s “on-the-spot observations” is not categorically
prohibited if it is reasonable. 32 Specifically, the Court noted the distinction
between a search and seizure and a Terry Stop and Terry Frisk. 33 The Terry
Stop is a brief investigative detention of an individual when there is
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 34 Subsequently, if an
officer has reasonable suspicion that an individual “may be armed and
presently dangerous,” then an officer may conduct a limited search, which is
known as a Terry Frisk. 35 The Court made clear that “police can stop and
briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity
‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” 36

25. See id. at 30 (“Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts.”).
26. See infra Section II.B.
27. See infra Section II.A.
28. See infra Section II.B.
29. See infra Section II.C.
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
31. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014).
32. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 30. The Court found that Terry stops are less invasive than a seizure. Id. at 16.
35. Id. at 30. The Court distinguished Terry frisks from a search. Id. at 16.
36. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). The Terry
Court held that a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads [them] reasonably to conclude in light of [their] experience that
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Thus, the standard introduced in Terry, known as the “reasonable
suspicion” standard, is less demanding than the probable cause standard that
is discussed in the text of the Fourth Amendment. 37 Reasonable suspicion
“can be established with information that is different in quantity or content
than” probable cause and “can arise from information that is less reliable
than” what is required for probable cause. 38 While reasonable suspicion need
not be shown by a preponderance of the evidence, the level of suspicion must
be more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” 39
Although the reasonable suspicion standard is less than the probable cause
standard, the police conduct is still “tested by the Fourth Amendment’s
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 40 Thus, the
concepts behind the warrant procedure and the requirement of probable cause
are still relevant in the reasonableness context. 41
The reasonableness assessment balances the weight of the government’s
interest, supported by rational inferences from specific and articulable facts,
and a citizen’s constitutionally protected interests. 42 The facts must be
judged against an objective standard— a simple good faith part on the officer
is not enough. 43 Like probable cause, the inferences underlying a reasonable
suspicion must be supported by “probabilities” and other understandings of
common experience. 44 Thus, although the reasonableness standard is lower
than the probable cause standard, both standards depend upon the facts of
each case. 45 There is no categorical rule. 46
When a court assesses whether an officer had the requisite reasonable
suspicion to seize a driver, the court consistently relies on the “totality of the
circumstances—the whole picture.” 47 A court does not analyze each
individual circumstance separately because each fact, individually, might
criminal activity may be afoot . . . and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel [their] reasonable fear for [their] own or others’ safety[.]” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
37. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
38. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
39. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 21.
43. Id. at 21–22. The objective standard asks, “would the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the
action taken was appropriate?” Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
44. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
45. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
46. Id.
47. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417; see also id. at 419 (holding that the trial court considered all the
circumstances, including the officer’s familiarity with the area, his knowledge of the practice of
those who smuggle aliens, and the clues that had developed for two months); United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (explaining all the facts taken together warranted the conclusion
that the individual was smuggling narcotics).

2021]

GRANTING LAW ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

53

warrant a conclusion of innocent behavior, but taken together the facts might
suggest criminal activity. 48 Consideration of all of the facts matter because
some actions may appear innocent “at a certain time or in a certain place,”
but may also signal “criminal activity under different circumstances.” 49
Accordingly, to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, a court must
look at all the facts taken together. 50
When considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court
recognizes that officers may draw inferences from their professional
experience and common sense. 51 The Court has emphasized that police
officers may draw inferences that might otherwise “elude an untrained
person” due to their investigatory expertise. 52 Likewise, an officer’s
expertise may make some inferences unreasonable that would otherwise
appear reasonable to a layperson. 53 Additionally, the Court has explained
that the reasonableness assessment may be based on an officer’s
commonsense judgments. 54 An officer’s reasonable suspicion does not need
to be correct—it only needs to have been reached by a “reasonably prudent
man” in the police officer’s position. 55 This assessment may include an

48. Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 104, 816 A.2d 901, 904 (Md. 2003); see also Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (agreeing an individual’s flight from officers is not necessarily
indicative of ongoing criminal activity and by itself may be lawful); Terry, 392 U.S. at 6, 22
(observing that the facts individually supported innocent behavior but taken together, they suggested
that the individuals were casing the store for a robbery).
49. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008); see Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275–76
(noting that a defendant’s behavior may be completely normal in one situation, while completely
unusual in another circumstance).
50. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417.
51. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273
52. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
53. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5 (explaining that the officer had many years of experience and
developed routine habits of observation over the years); Cortez, 449 U.S. at 419 (noting that it was
of critical importance that the officers were familiar with the crossing point and based on their
experience they were aware that it was common practice for persons to lead aliens through the desert
to be picked up by a vehicle); United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 414 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
reasonable suspicion determination demands that facts—whether seemingly innocent or obviously
incriminating—be assessed in light of their effect on the respective officer’s perception of the
situation at hand.”).
54. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 402 (2014) (concluding that it is common sense
to find that certain driving behaviors are sound indicia of drunk driving); see also Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (holding the officer was justified in using their commonsense judgment of inferring that the individual was engaging in criminal activity when they fled the
area of heavy narcotics and demonstrated nervous, evasive behavior).
55. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (citations
omitted) (explaining reasonable suspicion “as ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting
the person stopped of criminal activity . . . and probable cause to search as existing where the known
facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found”).
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officer’s “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” 56
Ultimately, when the Court determines whether an officer “acted reasonably
in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience.” 57
B. Development of the Reasonable Suspicion Doctrine in the Courts
after Terry v. Ohio
The facts in Terry prompted the Court to hold that an officer can stop
an individual if there is reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot
and the officer can articulate the facts that caused the officer’s suspicion.58
Although the reasonable suspicion standard is lower than probable cause,
courts have recognized that the reasonable suspicion standard is not carte
blanche for law enforcement officers. 59
Officers must point to and explain specific facts to demonstrate
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 60 Thus, the courts must consider the
inferences drawn from the officer and not substitute the courts judgment on
the facts. 61 The officer must be able to articulate some type of logic that the
court can defer to, 62 particularly in situations where an individual might
perceive the activity to be suspicious in one situation but completely innocent
56. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
57. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
58. Id. at 21. The officer observed two individuals standing together on the street corner for an
extended period of time. Id. at 23. The officer was unable to say exactly what drew his eye to these
two people, but he had thirty-nine years of experience and was assigned to patrol this area for
shoplifters and pickpockets for almost thirty years. Id. at 5. Based on his experience and the
foregoing observations, the officer suspected the two individuals of robbing the store and feared
they may have a gun. Id. at 6.
59. Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490, 508, 970 A.2d 894, 904 (Md. 2009).
60. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981) (concluding the officers had
reasonable suspicion when they articulated multiple facts and clues that supported the deductions
and inferences drawn about the individuals); see also United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 248
(4th Cir. 2011) (“The Government must also be able to either articulate why a particular behavior
is suspicious or logically demonstrate, given the surrounding circumstances, that the behavior is
likely to be indicative of some more sinister activity than may appear at first glance.”); see also
Crosby, 408 Md. at 508, 970 A.2d at 904 (explaining the officer must be able to articulate “how the
observed conduct, when viewed in the context of all of the other circumstances known to the officer”
indicated criminal activity was afoot).
61. See United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 414 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that the trial court
did not give “‘due weight’ to the inferences drawn by” the officer and instead “substituted its
‘innocent’ take on the facts for” the officers’ perspective).
62. See Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 111, 816 A.2d 901, 908 (Md. 2003) (“[I]f the officer
seeks to justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion based on that conduct, the officer ordinarily must
offer some explanation of why he or she regarded the conduct as suspicious; otherwise, there is no
ability to review the officer’s action.”).
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in another situation. 63 Without any logic to defer to, the court does not have
the ability to review the officer’s actions. 64 Consequently, the Court has
declined to find reasonable suspicion in circumstances where the officer
cannot articulate facts to justify the investigatory stop. 65 In Delaware v.
Prouse, 66 the officer stopped an automobile, smelled marijuana smoke while
approaching the vehicle, and seized the marijuana, which was in plain view
on the car floor. 67 The officer’s only explanation for pulling the individual
over was “to check the driver’s license and registration.” 68 The Court held
that pulling over a vehicle and detaining its driver to verify the driver’s
compliance with licensing and registration laws, without facts suggesting a
violation of the law, is “unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 69
When looking at the totality of the circumstances, courts must not view
“each individual circumstance for separate consideration” because one
factor, by itself, may constitute completely innocent behavior. 70 Only when
the court looks at facts and inferences in conjunction with other factors may
they amount to reasonable suspicion. 71 In Illinois v. Wardlow, 72 an individual
fled on foot after seeing police officers patrolling in an area known for heavy
narcotics trafficking. 73 The Court recognized that there may be innocent
reasons for an individual to flee police and an individual’s presence in an area
of heavy narcotics trafficking, alone, is not enough to support reasonable
63. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276 (2002) (explaining the officer is entitled to
make the assessment in light of his training and experience when the situation indicates behavior
that an officer could interpret differently depending on the surrounding circumstances).
64. Ransome, 373 Md. at 111, 816 A.2d at 908.
65. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (declining to find reasonable suspicion when
the officer “was unable to point to any facts supporting” their conclusion that the situation appeared
suspicious); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (explaining individuals traveling
“on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at
the unbridled discretion of police officers”); United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 252–53 (4th
Cir. 2015) (holding reasonable suspicion did not exist when “[t]he deputies neither articulated how
[the suspect’s] particular behavior was suspicious nor logically demonstrated that [the suspect’s]
behavior was indicative of some more sinister activity than appeared at first glance”); Crosby, 408
Md. at 515, 970 A.2d at 908 (holding that the officer’s belief was unreasonable when the officer
was “[w]ithout particularized and objective reasons that support[ed] a different interpretation of
what he observed”).
66. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
67. Id. at 650.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 663.
70. Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 104, 816 A.2d 901, 904 (Md. 2003); see also Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal
activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the
person is committing a crime.”); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (“Any one of these
factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel.”).
71. United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004).
72. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
73. Id. at 121.

56

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 80:48

suspicion. 74 However, the Court considered the totality of the circumstances
and noted that the location, unprovoked flight, and the individual’s nervous
behavior gave the officer reasonable suspicion to stop them. 75 Thus, the
Court has explicitly rejected the idea that a single factor can justify
reasonable suspicion for an officer to pursue an investigatory stop. 76
C. Conflict Between an Individual’s Privacy Interest and an Officer’s
Public Safety Interest
As established in Terry, the reasonable suspicion doctrine balances law
enforcement’s intrusion on an individual’s privacy against governmental
safety interests. 77 One of the main governmental interests is “effective crime
prevention and detection.” 78 However, as the Terry Court explained, even a
non-intrusive physical pat down is an “intrusion upon cherished personal
security” worthy of protection. 79 Thus, courts must also consider the nature
and quality of the intrusion on individual rights. 80 In Prouse, the Court
balanced the governmental interest in conducting traffic stops against the
individual’s privacy interest. 81 While recognizing the practical challenges of
ensuring that all vehicles are properly inspected and that their drivers are
licensed, the Court ruled that random highway inspection checks are
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 82 The Court agreed that states have an
interest in ensuring their highway safety laws are followed to protect their
citizens on roadways. 83 However, individuals also have a reasonable
expectation of privacy when traveling in a vehicle because it is a typical and

74. Id. at 124–25.
75. Id. at 124.
76. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–86 (1975) (emphasizing the
officer’s reliance on one factor––the Mexican ancestry of the occupatants––did not justify the
officer’s reasonable belief that they were non-U.S. citizens); United States v. Neff, 681 F.3d 1134,
1141 (10th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that the decision to use a highway exit after seeing a drug
checkpoint may be a valid, persuasive factor in the analysis, but standing alone it is insufficient to
justify even a brief investigatory detention of a vehicle).
77. See Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967) (explaining that there is “no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the
invasion which the search [or seizure] entails”).
78. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). The Supreme Court explained that this interest
“underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Id.
79. Id. at 25.
80. Id. at 24.
81. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
82. Id. at 658–59.
83. Id. at 658.
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necessary mode of transportation. 84 In balancing these two interests, the
Court reasoned that the state’s interest in slightly improved highway safety
was outweighed by the substantial privacy invasion of officers searching
“every occupant of every vehicle on the roads.” 85
Courts have analyzed many cases and numerous facts involving whether
an officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 86 Before the Glover
decision, the Supreme Court had only infrequently analyzed cases in which
a traffic stop was initiated with very limited facts and no officer testimony. 87
Thus, the cases discussed throughout this section provide insight and
guidance for specific types of inferences and factors officers may draw upon
that may help guide courts in determining whether an officer has the requisite
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. 88
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Kansas v. Glover, the Court considered whether it is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment for an officer to infer that the owner-is-the-driver and
subsequently conduct an investigatory stop if a vehicle’s registered owner
has a revoked license. 89 The Court explained that such a scenario does not
violate the Fourth Amendment and, absent information to the contrary, it is
reasonable for a police officer to assume that a vehicle’s registered owner is
driving the vehicle. 90
The Court began by reasoning it “cannot reasonably demand scientific
certainty where . . . none exists,” and rather, the courts “must permit officers
to make ‘commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.’” 91
Subsequently, the Court explained that Mehrer drew a commonsense
inference and had more than reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. 92 The
Court permitted this inference because of three facts: (1) Mehrer observed an
individual operating a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate
295ATJ; (2) the registered owner of the truck had a revoked license; and (3)
84. Id. at 662. But see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (explaining there is a
diminished expectation of privacy surrounding the automobile because “its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects”).
85. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
86. See supra Section II.B.
87. See supra Section II.B.
88. See supra Section II.B.
89. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2020).
90. Id. In other words, a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer
initiates an investigative stop after running a vehicle’s license and learning that the registered owner
has a revoked license. Id.
91. Id. at 1188 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
92. Id.
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the model of the truck matched the observed vehicle. 93 The Court rejected
the argument that the registered owner is not always the driver because that
logic could apply to all reasonable inferences. 94
The Court further relied on empirical studies to reject the idea that
Glover’s revoked license negated a finding of reasonable suspicion. 95 These
empirical studies demonstrated that drivers with revoked licenses usually
continue to drive and therefore pose safety risks to pedestrians. 96
Additionally, the Court reasoned that the Kansas license-revocation scheme
supports the reasonableness of Mehrer’s inference that an individual may
continue to drive with a revoked license because drivers have already shown
disregard for the law. 97
Glover raised two arguments as to why Mehrer’s inference was
unreasonable. 98 First, Glover argued that the inference was not grounded in
Mehrer’s law enforcement training or experience. 99 The Court rejected this
argument, explaining that “[t]he inference that the driver of a car is its
registered owner does not require any specialized training; rather, it is a
reasonable inference made by ordinary people on a daily basis.” 100 Further,
“reasonable suspicion is an ‘abstract’ concept that cannot be reduced to ‘a
neat set of legal rules.’” 101 The Court then noted the implications of requiring
officers to point to specific training materials or field experiences, explaining
that it would place a burden on officers and inevitably “tie a traffic stop’s

93. Id.
94. Id. The Court explained that even though the registered owner of a vehicle is not always
the driver of the vehicle, the reasonable suspicion inquiry does not have to be perfect because the
reasonable suspicion inquiry “‘falls considerably short’ of [fifty-one] percent accuracy.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1188–89; see KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-255(a)(1)–(4) (2021) (stating the State is
authorized to revoke a person’s driving privileges if the person “(1) [h]as been convicted with such
frequency of serious offenses against traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles as to
indicate a disrespect for traffic laws and a disregard for the safety of other persons on the highways;
(2) has been convicted of three or more moving traffic violations committed on separate occasions
within a [twelve]-month period; (3) is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle; (4) has been convicted
of a moving traffic violation, committed at a time when the person’s driving privileges were
restricted, suspended, or revoked”).
98. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1189–90.
99. Id. at 1189. Glover argued that the stop was unreasonable because Mehrer did not draw
upon his training or experience to develop inferences that would justify the traffic stop. Id.
100. Id. The Court stated that nothing in its Fourth Amendment precedent supports the notion
that an officer can draw inferences based on knowledge gained only through law enforcement
experience or training. Id.
101. Id. at 1190 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)).
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validity to the officer’s length of service.” 102 Second, Glover argued that a
holding for the State would “eviscerate” the Court’s “specific and articulable
facts” requirement by relying “exclusively on probabilities.” 103 The Court
denied this argument, explaining that officers are like jurors in that they may
rely on probabilities in the reasonable suspicion context. 104 Thus, the Court
concluded that combining database information provided to the officer and
commonsense judgments of the officer is “fully consonant with this Court’s
Fourth Amendment precedents.” 105
Lastly, the Court emphasized the narrow scope of the holding, noting
that the presence of additional facts in this case might have dispelled
reasonable suspicion. 106 The Court then concluded by clarifying that the
officer’s actions must be justified and courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances in light of the facts of each case. 107 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Kagan reiterated the narrow scope of the holding and reached the
same conclusion as the majority by relying solely on the fact that Mehrer
knew the registered owner had a tendency for breaking driving laws. 108
Justice Kagan further emphasized that the license revocation scheme in
Kansas required “serious or repeated driving violations,” and therefore,
Mehrer’s inference was reasonable. 109
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority
ignored key foundations of reasonable suspicion and reduced the State’s
burden of proof. 110 Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority’s view on
the reasonable suspicion inquiry and instead explained that the reasonable
suspicion inquiry deliberately avoids judicial common sense, does not
accommodate the average person’s intuition, and favors viewing “‘the facts
through the lens of police experience and expertise.’” 111 Specifically, she
noted “[i]t is the reasonable officer’s assessment, not the ordinary person’s—
or judge’s—judgment, that matters.” 112 When looking at reasonable
102. Id. The Court noted that their reasoning does not minimizing the significant role that
specialized training and experience plays, but simply notes that it is not a requirement in every
instance. Id.
103. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1191. Specifically, the Court explained that there may be no reasonable suspicion in
a situation where “an officer knows that the registered owner of the vehicle is in his mid-sixties but
observes that the driver is in her mid-twenties . . . .” Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1194 (Kagan, J., concurring).
109. Id. Justice Kagan explained that the case may have been different if the driver’s license
was suspended instead of revoked. Id. at 1192.
110. Id. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 1195 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).
112. Id. at 1195.
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suspicion, she emphasized that “past cases have considered the ‘totality of
the circumstances—the whole picture,’” 113 however this case “rests on just
one key fact: that the vehicle was owed by someone with a revoked
license.” 114 Additionally, she explained that the State has the burden of
“articulat[ing] factors supporting its reasonable suspicion, usually through a
trained agent.” 115 Therefore, she argued that the majority flipped the burden
of proof and “permits Kansas police officers to effectuate roadside stops
whenever they lack ‘information negating an inference’ that a vehicle’s
unlicensed owner is its driver.” 116 Finally, she noted some implications of
the majority’s holding, specifically emphasizing that reasonable suspicion
may now be found “based on nothing more than a demographic profile.” 117
IV. ANALYSIS
In Kansas v. Glover, the Supreme Court held “when [an] officer lacks
information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle,
the stop is reasonable.” 118 The Court’s holding takes an additional step
towards granting law enforcement more deference in conducting
investigatory stops. 119 The Court erroneously departed from precedent by
relying on an officer’s assumptions instead of inferences and failing to
consider an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest. 120 The Court
ignored law enforcement’s primary responsibility to further investigate
potential criminal activity and traffic violations and importantly, discouraged
them from further doing so. 121 Ultimately, the Court failed to consider the
negative implications of this rule, specifically how it will disproportionately
affect individuals in disadvantaged communities. 122
A. The Supreme Court Departed from the Reasonable Suspicion
Standard Originally Established in Terry v. Ohio
In Glover, the Court created a presumption that the driver of a vehicle
is also the registered owner of the vehicle if there is no information to negate
the officer’s inference. 123 This presumption is contrary to what the
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1194 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1195 (quoting Id. at 1186–87 (majority opinion)).
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1186 (majority opinion).
See infra Section IV.A–IV.C.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See supra text accompanying note 118.
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reasonable suspicion doctrine previously required. 124 Despite correctly
finding that officers may draw upon commonsense inferences, the Court
erroneously substituted assumptions for inferences and implied that an
officer’s assumption alone was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. 125
Additionally, the Court failed to require Mehrer to articulate any logic as to
why he developed reasonable suspicion. 126 Lastly, the Court departed from
considering an individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy interest. 127 As a
result, the Court further blurred the already unsettled reasonable suspicion
standard and made investigatory stops presumptively reasonable. 128
1. The Court Erroneously Labeled an Assumption an Inference and
Permitted Law Enforcement to Assume Individuals Are Engaging
in Crime
The Court ignored the crucial difference between an assumption and an
inference and, in doing so, implied officers are permitted to assume
individuals are engaging in crime. 129 Reasonable suspicion requires officers
to draw upon their commonsense inferences, not assumptions, to show
specific and articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot. 130 An assumption
is a belief that is accepted as true without proof, whereas an inference is a
conclusion based on a premise and evidence. 131 Mehrer’s inference that
Glover had a revoked license was supported, ex post facto, by the evidence
in the database; 132 however, Mehrer’s assumption that Glover was also the
driver of the vehicle was supported by no evidence or proof at the time of the

124. See infra Section IV.A.1–3.
125. See infra Section IV.A.1.
126. See infra Section IV.A.2.
127. See infra Section IV.A.3.
128. See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1197 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the
majority’s logic “has thus made the [s]tate’s task all but automatic” and that “[t]hat has never been
the law, and it never should be”); Dennis J. Buffone, Traffic Stops, Reasonable Suspicion, and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: A State Constitutional Analysis, 69 U. PITTSBURGH L. REV. 331,
332 (2007) (noting the originally established Terry standard left “no doubt that the exception was
to be construed and applied in only the narrowest of contexts” but as the lower courts applied it, the
standard became blurred considerably).
129. See State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 69 (Kan. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover, 140 S.
Ct. 1183 (2020) (explaining the dictionary defines “an assumption [as] ‘a statement accepted or
supposed true without proof or demonstration’” and “an inference is ‘[s]omething inferred; a
conclusion based on a premise,’ and to infer is ‘[t]o conclude from evidence; deduce’ or ‘[t]o have
as a logical consequence’” (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting American
Heritage Dictionary, 80, 673 (1969))).
130. See supra notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text.
131. Glover, 422 P.3d at 69.
132. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1187 (majority opinion) (noting the files indicated that Glover had
a revoked driver’s license in the State of Kansas).
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stop. 133 To the contrary, Mehrer based his assumption on another
assumption: that most individuals driving a car are also the owner of the
car. 134 Mehrer failed to offer any specific articulated logic to support his
assumption, and the Court did not require him to do so. 135 Instead, the Court
suggested that Mehrer’s assumption satisfied the requisite “commonsense
inference[s]” 136 for the reasonable suspicion inquiry and, consequently,
implied that officers may assume individuals are engaging in criminal
behavior. 137
The Court created a presumption of “general criminal inclination” by
allowing Mehrer to assume the owner is the driver and subsequently
assuming that the owner is disregarding state law by continuing to drive on a
revoked license. 138 However, an individual with a revoked driver’s license
does not commit a crime by owning a vehicle, and an individual with a
revoked license does not commit a crime by allowing another licensed driver
to use their registered vehicle. 139 A crime occurs only when the unlicensed
driver operates the vehicle. 140 Therefore, the mere presence of a truck on the
road, even if the truck is owned by an unlicensed driver, is not a reasonable
basis for suspecting criminal activity. 141 This presumption is contrary to the
Fourth Amendment standard, our constitutional scheme, and a system of
fairness—citizens are presumed to be “engaged in lawful activities” and

133. See id. (“Based solely on the information that the registered owner of the truck was revoked,
Deputy Mehrer initiated a traffic stop.”).
134. See id. at 1187 (“The court further explained that Deputy Mehrer’s ‘hunch’ involved
‘applying and stacking unstated assumptions that are unreasonable without further factual basis,’
namely, that ‘the registered owner was likely the primary driver of the vehicle’ and that the ‘the
owner will likely disregard the suspension or revocation order and continue to drive.’” (quoting
State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 68–70 (2018))).
135. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1186 (“We hold that when the officer lacks information negating
an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle, the stop is reasonable.”).
136. Id.. at 1188.
137. State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 72 (Kan. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct.
1183 (2020). It is not always reasonable to assume that all individuals are following the law,
however, “Deputy Mehrer did not observe any traffic infractions, and did not attempt to identify the
driver [of] the truck.” Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1187 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
138. Glover, 422 P.3d at 70.
139. Id. at 68. The activity must be “specific enough to permit an innocent citizen to be
differentiated from one who is actually guilty.” Margaret Anne Hoehl, Usual Suspects Beware:
“Walk, Don’t Run” Through Dangerous Neighborhoods, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 136 (2001).
140. Glover, 422 P.3d at 68.
141. See e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“The fact that appellant was in a
neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding the appellant
himself was engaged in criminal conduct.”); see Hoehl, supra note 139, at 136–37 (noting that the
characteristic considered “must be more often present when a crime is being committed than when
it is not; otherwise, it has no probative value”).
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should be free from government interference. 142 Therefore, the crucial
question the Court needed to answer in Glover was whether Mehrer had
reasonable suspicion to stop the driver of Glover’s vehicle—not whether
there was reasonable suspicion to stop Glover himself. 143
2. The Court Failed to Require the Officer to Articulate Specific
Facts to Demonstrate Reasonable Suspicion
The Court departed from the precedent in Fourth Amendment
reasonable suspicion cases—officers must point to specific and articulable
facts to support their inferences. 144 The reasonable suspicion inquiry is
inherently fact-specific and does not recognize bare assumptions. 145 A
specific and articulable fact “is one that adds to the likelihood of criminal
activity, given the other facts also observed.” 146 It is based on articulable
circumstances available to the officer at the time of the incident—not
inarticulable circumstances or ex post evidence. 147 In Brown v. Texas, 148 the
officer explained that the individual’s behavior “‘looked suspicious,’” but the
officer failed to “point to any facts supporting that conclusion.” 149 Similarly,
in Glover, Mehrer assumed the owner of the car was also the driver, but
Mehrer did not “point to any facts supporting that conclusion.” 150 At the time
142. Glover, 422 P.3d at 70; see Brief of the Rutherford Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 9, Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (No. 18-556) (“Mr. Glover was thus
entitled to the benefit of this presumption until it could be shown through specific, articulable
evidence that there was reason to believe he was committing a criminal act.”).
143. Glover, 422 P.3d at 68 (emphasis added).
144. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
145. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (holding officers must have
“articulable reasons” or “founded suspicions” from the “totality of the circumstances—the whole
picture”); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 217
(1983) (explaining reasonable suspicion deals with probabilities but every action “must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949))); see also
Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (requiring officers to articulate “objective facts” to demonstrate their
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is present); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (explaining reasonable
suspicion is more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’”).
146. See Johnson, supra note 145, at 217 (emphasis added).
147. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51–52 (explaining there were no “circumstances preceding the
officers’ detention” that justified reasonable suspicion that the individual was involved in criminal
activity); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1153
(2012) [hereinafter Police Efficiency] (noting the Terry doctrine requires officers to base suspicions
on specific and particular facts for the purpose of “prevent[ing] policing based upon stereotypes of
criminality”); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886 n. 11 (1975) (rejecting
the presence of after-the-fact justifications); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (asking “whether the officer’s
action was justified at its inception” (emphasis added)).
148. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
149. Id. at 52.
150. Id.; see Brief of Professor Andrew Manuel Crespo as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Affirmance at 22, Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (No. 18-556) [hereinafter Brief of
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of the incident in Glover, Mehrer only knew the registered owner of the
pickup truck had a revoked driver’s license. 151 Mehrer needed to first point
to specific and articulable facts linking the driver of the vehicle as the
registered owner. 152 Without the officer offering “some explanation of why
[the officer] regarded the conduct as suspicious,” the Court has “no ability to
review the officer’s action.” 153
3. The Court Failed to Consider an Individual’s Fourth Amendment
Privacy Interest
Law enforcement has a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified
to drive are operating motor vehicles, but that interest needs to be properly
balanced with an individual’s privacy interest. 154 Importantly, many people
choose to drive deliberately—they seek to enjoy a “greater sense of security
and privacy” in their car than they would on a bus or sidewalk. 155 In Glover,
the Court failed to consider “the gravity of the crime under investigation and
the privacy intrusion resulting from the police activity.” 156 Consequently, the
Court gave officers the opportunity to further intrude on individual privacy
rights, specifically of those who borrow cars where the owner of the car has
a revoked license. 157 An investigatory stop that “is not based on objective

Professor Crespo] (explaining that instead of presenting facts the “State opted to draft a stipulation
of facts that contain[ed] no information whatsoever” proving that the owner was the driver).
151. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020).
152. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
153. Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 111, 816 A.2d 901, 908 (Md. 2003); see Margaret Raymond,
Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in
Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO STATE L.J. 99, 142 (1999) (finding judicial oversight
and supervision is possible because “it requires the officer to proffer an articulable justification that
can be meaningfully reviewed”).
154. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976) (explaining that when assessing the
reasonableness of the officer’s conduct “it is necessary ‘first to focus upon the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private
citizen’” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534–535 (1976)); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (“An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to
government regulation.”).
155. Delaware, 440 U.S. at 662. But see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (finding
there is a diminished expectation of privacy surrounding the automobile).
156. Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407, 463
(2006); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1974) (balancing the public
interest against “the interference with individual liberty that results when an officer stops an
automobile and questions its occupants”).
157. See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
majority’s distinction between revocation and suspension may not hold up in other
jurisdictions . . . . Whether the majority’s ‘common sense’ assumptions apply outside of Kansas is
thus open to challenge.”); The Rise of the One Car Family, NATIONWIDE (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://blog.nationwide.com/one-car-family/ (finding many teenagers are “content with a car-free
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criteria” creates a greater “risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices.” 158
Therefore, an officer should balance the impact of the intrusion against the
resulting social harm; there is likely little social harm from a failure to stop
an individual with a suspended or revoked driver’s license, but doing so
creates a situation where the intrusion could end up being large. 159 For
example, an officer that does not confirm the identity of a driver could end
up pulling over someone who is driving their parent’s car, resulting in an
innocent individual being subjected to a stop and potentially a search. 160
Additionally, the harm in failing to investigate an unlicensed driver is likely
small because the majority of license suspensions or revocations stem from
the failure to pay fines. 161 In contrast, in a situation where an officer has a
hunch that an individual entering the airport has a bomb, the resulting harm
would greatly outweigh the impact of the intrusion. 162 Ultimately, an
individual who borrows a car should not lose all expectation of privacy
simply because the owner of the car has a revoked license. 163
In an opportunity to clarify the reasonable suspicion doctrine, the Court
further blurred the reasonable suspicion standard and established that an
officer’s assumption provides the basis for reasonable suspicion if there is no
information to negate the assumption. 164 Significantly, the Court departed
from requiring officers to articulate facts and inferences to support their
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. 165 Importantly, the Court granted
“yet another ‘constitutional’ set of circumstances upon which the police may
lifestyle” and likely will not own their own car because of the rise in self-driving cars and ride
sharing services); supra text accompanying note 90.
158. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
159. See e.g., Lerner, supra note 156, at 466 (explaining an officer that suspects an individual
with a gun results in an intrusion that is likely small but “the social harm that would result from a
failure to stop the particular crime is great”).
160. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
161. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1192 (Kagan, J., concurring) (noting that studies suggest that most
license suspensions relate to being poor, not driving behaviors); Suspended or Revoked License,
DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, https://dmv.dc.gov/service/suspended-or-revoked-license (last visited
Oct. 29, 2020) (finding failure to make child support payments as a reason for having a driver’s
license revoked); see Jon A. Carnegie & Robert J. Eger, Reasons for Driver License Suspension,
Recidivism, and Crash Involvement Among Drivers with Suspended/Revoked Licenses, NAT’L
HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC
SAFETY
ADMIN.
1,
7
(Jan.
2009),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/811092_driver-license.pdf (finding the
most common reasons for license suspensions include failure to comply with child support, maintain
proper insurance, alcohol or drug-related offenses by minors, and failure to pay court fines).
162. Lerner, supra note 156, at 466.
163. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (emphasizing traveling by car as “a basic,
pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one’s home, workplace, and
leisure activities” and that “[m]any people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking
on the streets”).
164. See supra text accompanying note 90.
165. See supra Section IV.A.2.
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depend in their ever-vigilant quest to arbitrarily enforce the power granted to
them by the courts.” 166 The more the Court grants law enforcement this
power, the more the Fourth Amendment erodes, and inevitably officers may
stop more innocent individuals. 167
B. The Court Wrongfully Ignored Law Enforcement’s Primary
Responsibility and Discouraged Law Enforcement Officers from
Further Investigating
In Glover, the Court ignored the experience and specialized training that
officers receive and failed to require officers to do what they are more than
capable of doing—further investigate potential criminal activity and traffic
violations. 168 The courts defer to law enforcement in a reasonable suspicion
analysis “because they have the knowledge, the expertise, and, ultimately,
the responsibility for combatting crime,” 169 especially in situations where the
activity “might well be unremarkable in one instance . . . while quite unusual
in another.” 170 When an officer learns that the owner of a vehicle has a
revoked or suspended license, it is entirely possible that either the owner is
continuing to drive or that someone else is driving the owner’s vehicle. 171 As
166. Hoehl, supra note 139, at 146.
167. See Amie Stepanovich, Fourth Amendment Eroded, REASON (Jan. 2014),
https://reason.com/2013/12/29/fourth-amendment-eroded/ (“[G]overnment lawyers have argued
repeatedly that [the Fourth Amendment] right should be limited, and the Supreme Court has often
agreed.”); see also Hoehl, supra note 139, at 146–47 (“Unless the courts are willing to backpedal
and return to the original, narrowly circumscribed holding of Terry, citizens on the street will
continue to see their rights and expectations gradually fade into nonexistence.”).
168. See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The
consequence of the majority’s approach is to absolve officers from any responsibility to investigate
the identity of a driver where feasible.”); see also Lerner, supra note 156, at 472–73 (explaining
that officers are the ones that track down a criminal while respecting the rights of innocents but to
make this happen depends upon “the quality of police recruits, the nature of their training, [and] the
competence of the police command structure”).
169. David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 665 (1994); see Police Efficiency, supra note 147, at 1156 (“With the
proper training and experience, officers may learn to make accurate judgments about when an
individual’s actions denote criminality . . . . [A]n appropriately trained and experienced officer is
likely more proficient than the courts at determining whether a particular set of circumstances is
suspicious.”). But see L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 2035, 2068 (2011) [hereinafter Arrest Efficiency] (“[O]fficers may be more likely to be
influenced by the operation of implicit biases than civilians, which may cause officers to incorrectly
interpret ambiguous behavior as suspicious when engaged in by blacks as opposed to whites.”).
170. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 275, 276 (2002).
171. See New Report Finds New York Has Severe Racial Disparities in Traffic Enforcement and
Driver’s License Suspensions, FINES AND FEES JUST. CTR. (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/2020/02/18/new-report-finds-new-york-has-severe-racialdisparities-in-traffic-enforcement-and-drivers-license-suspensions/ [hereinafter New York Racial
Disparities] (“Driving is such a necessity that [seventy-five] percent of people continue to drive
after their license gets suspended.”); Bruce Schaller, In a Reversal, ‘Car Rich’ Households Are
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a result, these are situations where the Court has indicated it is perfectly
reasonable for the officer to confirm the owner is not behind the wheel. 172 In
this case, anyone could have been driving Glover’s vehicle. 173 However, the
Court held Mehrer to a lower standard than the Court originally established
in Terry. 174 In doing so, the Court rewarded law enforcement for poor police
work and discouraged them from investigating potential criminal activity or
traffic violations further. 175
Law enforcement has the responsibility of articulating inferences,
especially in this “type of geographically localized inquiry.” 176 By relieving
officers of their primary duty to articulate inferences, 177 the Court ignored
that reasonable minds may differ on what may be common sense in this
particular situation 178 and, therefore, some individuals may assume the
opposite—cars are commonly driven by individuals other than the registered
owner. 179 The Court failed to consider that the commonsense inference
Growing,
BLOOMBERG
CITYLAB
(Jan.
7,
2019,
7:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-07/despite-uber-and-lyft-urban-carownership-is-growing (finding in Seattle there has been a twenty-three percent increase in “carlight” households, meaning households with fewer vehicles than workers).
172. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1196 (“[T]here are countless other instances where officers have
been able to ascertain the identity of a driver from a distance and make out their approximate age
and gender.”); supra notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text.
173. See supra text accompanying note 171.
174. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 22 (1968) (requiring law enforcement to “point to specific
and articulable facts” because “[a]nything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches”).
175. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1197 (noting that the majority’s “logic has thus made the [s]tate’s task
all but automatic,” which is something “[t]hat has never been the law, and it never should be”).
176. Id. at 1196; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
177. See Brief of Professor Crespo, supra note 150, at 23–24 (“[A]ll one needs to do is count
how many times vehicles reportedly registered to unlicensed drivers are actually driven by those
individuals when such vehicles are stopped in the relevant geographic area.”).
178. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1192 (Kagan, J., concurring) (explaining it may be common sense
to “think that a person told not to drive on pain of criminal penalty would obey the order”); see also
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659–60 (1979) (“It seems common sense that the percentage of
all drivers on the road who are driving without a license is very small . . . .”); Brief of Professor
Crespo, supra note 150, at 24 (alteration in original) (explaining that from an officer’s “‘hit rate’
one can ‘compute the likelihood that any particular [stop] will result . . . in the discovery of
particular kinds of evidence,’ including an unlicensed driver sitting behind the wheel” (quoting
Sharad Goel, Maya Perelman, Ravi Shroff & David Alan Sklansky, Combatting Police
Discrimination in the Age of Big Data, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 181, 187 (2017)).
179. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1191 (noting that “[f]amilies share cars; friends borrow them”);
State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 67 (Kan. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183
(2020) (explaining the trial court judge found it was common for individuals other than the
registered owner to drive a vehicle because the judge herself had three cars registered in her name
that she, her daughter, and her husband drove); HUB SmartCoverage Team, Does the Car Owner
Have to be The Primary Driver?, HUB SMART COVERAGE (Oct. 18, 2017),
https://www.hubsmartcoverage.ca/blog/does-car-owner-have-be-primary-driver/ (acknowledging
the primary driver is not always the owner of the car, especially in situations where parents let a
teenager drive an older car or when people with poor credit are unable to purchase their own
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drawn may “depend on a number of different circumstances.” 180 The
probability of a non-owner driving a vehicle varies between city and even
neighborhood, 181 and there are many reasons why licenses are suspended—
many of them unrelated to driving. 182 Consequently, not requiring law
enforcement to demonstrate specific and articulable facts—when the
officer’s training has taught them to do exactly that—rewards officers for
what the Court has previously recognized as “poor police work.” 183
Most importantly, the rule adopted by the Court disincentivizes officers
from investigating further because, ultimately, if they did, it could undermine
reasonable suspicion. 184 If an officer runs an individual’s license plate and
learns that the registered owner has a revoked license, the officer will not
want to search for other information since “the presence of additional facts
might dispel reasonable suspicion.” 185 The Court implied that officers can
rely solely on assumptions, as long as no facts are present to negate the

vehicle); see also I. Wagner, Number of Vehicles Per Household in the United States from 2001 to
2017, STATISTA (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/551403/number-of-vehiclesper-household-in-the-united-states/ (finding that there are about 1.88 vehicles per U.S. household).
180. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see supra note 62 and accompanying text; see e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
276 (2002) (explaining a driver’s behavior on a busy San Francisco highway might be
unremarkable, while quite unusual in another instance such as on a remote portion of rural
southeastern Arizona); see also Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1198 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the
terminology about revoked versus suspended varies from state to state).
181. Orin S. Kerr, Reasonable Suspicion From Driver to Car: A Few Thoughts on Kansas v.
Glover, REASON (Oct. 13, 2019, 7:25 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2019/10/31/reasonablesuspicion-from-driver-to-car-a-few-thoughts-on-kansas-v-glover/. Family size may change the
likelihood that a non-owner is driving a car. Id. For example, a family living in Washington, D.C.
where the percentage of households with children is 18.9%, and a family living in Arlington,
Virginia, where the percentage of households with children is 33.8%. Richard Florida, Which U.S.
Cities Have the Most Families With Kids?, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Jan. 16, 2019, 9:25 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-16/which-u-s-cities-have-the-most-familieswith-kids. It is more likely that a teenager is driving the family car in Arlington, Virginia than in
Washington, D.C. See Kerr, supra note 181.
182. See Carnegie & Eger, supra note 161, at 7 (finding the most common reasons for license
suspensions include failure to comply with child support, maintain proper insurance, alcohol or
drug-related offenses by minors, and failure to pay court fines).
183. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (emphasizing it would have been poor police work
if the officer with thirty years of experience did not further investigate the two men standing on the
street corner, pacing, and pausing to stare in the same store window for an extended amount of
time).
184. See State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64, 70–71 (Kan. 2018), rev’d sub nom., Kansas v. Glover,
140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (observing that creating a rule that does not require officers to have a
particular and individualized suspicion that the registered owner was driving “motivates officers to
avoid confirming the identity of the driver because learning facts that suggest the registered owner
is not driving undermines reasonable suspicion”).
185. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1191 (majority opinion).
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inference. 186 More significantly, the Court provided that the reasonable
suspicion analysis includes an officer’s lack of information as part of the
totality of the circumstances. 187 As a result, the Court shifted further from
the requirement that officers point to specific and articulable facts 188 and
opened the door for officers to intrude further on an individual’s Fourth
Amendment privacy interest. 189
C. The Majority Failed to Acknowledge the Negative Implications of
its Holding on Disadvantaged Communities
In a time when police misconduct 190 and racial injustice 191 is prevalent
around the country, the Court “paved the road to finding reasonable suspicion
based on nothing more than a demographic profile.” 192 Law enforcement
officers already have considerable discretion in deciding to stop citizens, and
they should not have any more leeway to justify their constant stops of people
of color. 193 Before Glover, it was abundantly clear that law enforcement
officers stopped and searched non-white individuals more often than white
individuals. 194 Indeed, this disparity is more pronounced in the Black
community, resulting in “a phenomenon so pervasive, it has earned its own

186. See id. (“Deputy Mehrer possessed no exculpatory information—let alone sufficient
information to rebut the reasonable inference that Glover was driving his own truck—and thus the
stop was justified.”).
187. See supra note 186.
188. See Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining the majority’s
opinion “breaks from settled doctrine and dramatically alters” the evidence the State needs to prove
reasonable suspicion).
189. See infra Section IV.C.
190. See Khaleda Rahman, From George Floyd to Breonna Taylor, Remembering the Black
People Killed By Police in 2020, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 29, 2020, 12:14 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/george-floyd-breonna-taylor-black-people-police-killed-1556285
(noting that many of the events in 2020 “served as a wake-up call for many about the reality of
police brutality,” however many of the protests “did little to stop Black people disproportionately
dying at the hands of police officers”); Associated Press, Americans’ Opinions About Police
Brutality and Racial Injustice Have Moved Dramatically, MARKET WATCH (July 4, 2020, 1:03
PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/americans-opinions-about-police-brutality-and-racialinjustice-have-moved-dramatically-2020-07-04 (“About half of American adults believe police
violence against the public is a ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ serious problem . . . .”).
191. See Associated Press, supra note 190 (stating sixty-one percent of Americans today “say
police in most communities are more likely to use deadly force against a Black person than a white
person”).
192. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1197.
193. See Arrest Efficiency, supra note 169, at 2062–63 (explaining the reasonable suspicion test
allows “officers to act on their interpretation of ambiguous behaviors, [thus] the reasonable
suspicion test actually permits, rather than prevents, actions based upon racial hunches”).
194. See Findings, STAN. OPEN POLICING PROJECT, https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings/
(last visited Jan. 15, 2021) (finding in almost every jurisdiction Black and Hispanic drivers are
searched more often after the stop than white drivers).
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catch phrase: driving while Black.” 195 Importantly, now officers are given
further discretion that could be used in a way that has the practical effect of
harming non-white individuals to a greater degree. 196 In the wake of racial
injustice across the country, courts should be sensitive to the fact that often
police encounters can be difficult for minority populations. 197 This issue has
become so important that some states are taking steps to limit what the police
can rely on to stop individuals and what they can do once they stop
individuals. 198
As a result of Glover, law enforcement now has more discretion to
perform a traffic stop and search individuals in disadvantaged
communities. 199 One reason for this is because a majority of states enforce
driver’s license suspensions for unpaid fines and fees. 200 Individuals in poor
communities are less likely to be able to pay court fines and fees, which “can
set off a chain of problems.” 201 These individuals often must choose between

195. Philip V. McHarris, ‘I Experience a Hollowing Fear Any Time I’m Stopped by Police,’
NATION (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/driving-black-police-stops/;
see Tom Abate, Blacks Drivers Get Pulled Over by Police Less at Night When Their Race is
Obscured by ‘Veil of Darkness,’ Stanford Study Finds, STAN. NEWS (May 5, 2020),
https://news.stanford.edu/2020/05/05/veil-darkness-reduces-racial-bias-traffic-stops/ (explaining a
study conducted from 2011 to 2018 found that while blacks are much more likely to be pulled over
during the day, are “less likely to be stopped after sunset, when ‘a veil of darkness’ masks their
race”).
196. See supra Section IV.A.
197. Marsha Mercer, Police ‘Pretext’ Traffic Stops Need to End, Some Lawmakers Say, PEW
(Sept.
3,
2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2020/09/03/police-pretext-traffic-stops-need-to-end-some-lawmakers-say.
198. Id. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled in State v. Arreola-Botello that “police
could no longer pull someone over for a broken taillight or failure to signal, then ask unrelated
questions, such as asking for consent to search the car for illegal drugs or guns.” Id.
199. See Arrest Efficiency, supra note 169, at 2067 (“[A]n officer patrolling a poor, urban,
majority-black neighborhood is more prone to judge ambiguous behaviors as suspicious, causing
him to stop more individuals who are innocent.”); Ahmed Jallow, Police More Likely to Stop,
Search a Black Driver in Burlington Area: Times-News Investigation, TIMES NEWS (Oct. 21, 2020,
7:01 AM), https://www.thetimesnews.com/story/news/2020/10/21/police-more-likely-stop-searchblack-people-driving-burlington/5956475002/ (finding that once a law enforcement officer has
pulled someone over, it is about fifty percent more likely that the officer searches the vehicle if the
driver is Black compared to if they are white).
200. See Mario Salas & Angela Ciolfi, Driven By Dollars: A State-by-State Analysis of Driver’s
License Suspension Laws for Failure to Pay Court Debt, LEGAL AID JUST. CTR. 1, 1 (Sept. 15,
2017), https://www.justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf (“Fortythree states and the District of Columbia use driver’s license suspension to coerce payment of
government debts arising out of traffic or criminal convictions.”).
201. Joseph Shapiro, How Driver’s License Suspensions Unfairly Target The Poor, NPR (Jan.
5, 2015, 3:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/01/05/372691918/how-drivers-license-suspensionsunfairly-target-the-poor (finding people with lack of income constantly accumulate a series of
tickets); see Stephanie Agnew, Court Costs, Fines, and Fees are Bad Policy, CHICAGO APPLESEED
CTR. FOR FAIR CTS., http://www.chicagoappleseed.org/072220-court-costs-fines-fees-are-badpolicy/ (last visited June 10, 2021) (finding that any monetary sanction in the United States punishes
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refraining from driving, and jeopardizing their jobs, or continuing to drive
and risking “jail time and more unaffordable fines.” 202 Therefore, lowincome individuals are more likely to have their licenses suspended for
failing to pay fees. 203 Additionally, in disadvantaged communities, there is a
higher chance that the driver of the vehicle is not the owner of the vehicle. 204
Individuals in low-income communities are less likely to have more than one
vehicle per household, 205 and therefore it is more likely that in these
communities family members are sharing cars. 206 In conjunction with this,
communities of color will also be disproportionately impacted by the Glover
ruling because Black and Hispanic individuals are more likely to be poor than
white individuals. 207
Although the Court’s holding does not explicitly give police officers the
ability to stop suspects on bare assumptions, the Court’s reluctance to
explicitly reject bare assumptions will have the same effect. 208 After Glover,
police officers will be more likely to make stops based solely on their
assumptions—possibly influenced by implicit racial bias—rather than risk
stumbling upon exculpatory evidence to the contrary. 209 Disadvantaged
a person solely based on their wealth); see, e.g., New York Racial Disparities, supra note 171 (“For
low-income New Yorkers, losing your driver’s license can threaten your entire livelihood . . . .”).
202. New York Racial Disparities, supra note 171; see Agnew, supra note 201 (classifying a
wealthy person’s ability to pay a fine as “inconsequential to their survival” but a low-income single
parent’s ability to pay a fine “could mean choosing between buying groceries or paying rent”).
203. Salas & Ciolfi, supra note 200, at 1–2.
204. See Mobility Challenges for Households in Poverty, 2009 NAT’L HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL
SURV. 1, 2 (2014), https://nhts.ornl.gov/briefs/PovertyBrief.pdf (finding individuals at or below
poverty are most likely to only own one car in their household).
205. Brief of Amici Curiae Fines and Fees Just. Ctr. et al. In Support of Respondent at 10, Kansas
v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020) (No. 18-556) [hereinafter Brief of Fines and Fees Justice] (citing
Alan Berube et al., Socioeconomic Differences in Household Automobile Ownership Rates:
Implications for Evacuation Policy, 3 (June 2006)); see supra note 204 and accompanying text.
206. Brief of Fines and Fees Justice, supra note 205.
207. See John Creamer, Inequalities Persist Despite Decline in Poverty For All Major Race and
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Sept.
15,
2020),
Hispanic
Origin
Groups,
U.S.
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2020/09/poverty-rates-for-blacks-and-hispanics-reachedhistoric-lows-in-2019.html (finding that in 2019 the poverty rate for Blacks was 18.8% and 15.7%
for Hispanics compared to 7.3% for non-Hispanic Whites).
208. See Hoehl, supra note 139, at 136 (“To a seasoned police officer, almost any conduct may
be considered indicative of wrongdoing.”); Erin Killeen, Traffic Stops and Discriminatory Policing
in the United States, GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y (Apr. 26, 2018) (“It is well established that
police use these minor traffic violations as a pretext to stop drivers and search their cars for more
serious legal violations.”).
209. See Arrest Efficiency, supra note 169, at 2062 (noting “science demonstrates that race can
affect an officer’s interpretation of ambiguous behavior”); Police Efficiency, supra note 147, at 1151
(“The problem is that implicit biases may cause police officers to pay more attention to Blacks than
to Whites and to interpret the behaviors of Blacks as suspicious more readily than the identical
behaviors of Whites.”); Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing,
87 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 876, 876 (2004) (“Not only is the association between Blacks
and crime strong (i.e., consistent and frequent), it also appears to be automatic . . . .”).
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communities have often been viewed and classified as “high crime”
neighborhoods making them high targets for law enforcement. 210 Officers
have a considerable amount of discretion in considering whether reasonable
suspicion exists, and often factors such as race, location, or the time of day
are at the forefront of the reasonable suspicion analysis. 211 Nonetheless, the
Glover court failed to require officers to articulate specific facts and, thus,
granted law enforcement additional discretion to act upon their implicit
biases and further target disadvantaged communities. 212 Consequently,
individuals in low-income areas and communities of color are continuing to
be “stripped of their fundamental constitutional right to go about their
business.” 213
V. CONCLUSION
In Kansas v. Glover, the Supreme Court found that when the officer did
not have any information indicating that the owner was not the driver, the
stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 214 By departing from the
original reasonable suspicion analysis developed in Terry v. Ohio, 215 the
Court further expanded law enforcement’s ability to conduct investigatory
stops. 216 Despite correctly acknowledging that officers may rely on
commonsense inferences, the Court ignored law enforcement’s primary
responsibility to further investigate potential criminal activity and traffic
violations and, more importantly, discouraged officers from doing so. 217
Ultimately, the Court declined to consider the additional implications of this
holding, specifically failing to consider how the ruling negatively impacts
disadvantaged communities. 218

210. See Raymond, supra note 153, at 137–38 (finding that, as a statistical matter, people of
color are more likely to be found in high crime areas and therefore those individuals are
disproportionately burdened by police stops); see also Hoehl, supra note 139, at 131–32 (explaining
the court should not consider a neighborhood as a significant factor because “it allows police to use
factors which have a disproportionate impact on a lower socioeconomic class in order to establish
reasonable suspicion”).
211. Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 500
(2004) (arguing the reasonable suspicion standard needs “to elevate the suspect’s conduct above
ancillary factors”); see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (noting officers are not
required to ignore characteristics of a location and the fact that the stop occurred in a “‘high crime
area’” is a relevant contextual consideration (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144
(1972))).
212. See supra notes 199 and 209 and accompanying text.
213. Hoehl, supra note 139, at 137.
214. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2020).
215. See supra Section IV.A.
216. See supra Sections IV.A–IV.C.
217. See supra Section IV.B.
218. See supra Section IV.C.

